Court-Gazing by Williams, Stephen F.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 91 Issue 6 
1993 
Court-Gazing 
Stephen F. Williams 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law and Politics Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stephen F. Williams, Court-Gazing, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1158 (1993). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol91/iss6/6 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
COURT-GAZING 
Stephen F. Williams* 
TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME 
COURT. By David G. Savage. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
1992. Pp. 473. $22.95. 
DECIDING To DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT. By H. W. Perry, Jr. Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press. 1991. Pp. ix, 316. $39.95. 
I 
A blurb on the cover of David Savage's Turning Right declares 
that the book 
is a remarkably comprehensive and comprehensible history of one of the 
most crucial moments in American constitutional history - when the 
Reagan-Bush Supreme Court began the process of repudiating the War-
ren and Burger Courts' efforts to make the Constitution a bulwark for 
individual rights and an enzyme for social justice. . . . Basic reading for 
anyone who wants to understand the process by which the Supreme 
Court became the liberals' nightmare. 1 
Those who believe that this comment aptly summarizes the relation 
between the present Court and its predecessors will enjoy a shiver of 
excitement from Turning Right's portrayal of the black-robed barbari-
ans at the gate. Those who take a more nuanced view of the Court's 
evolution will not find much enlightenment. 
As the blurb suggests, the book's leitmotif is that the Court's post-
1980 appointees have set out with bulldozers to dismantle the rights 
found in the Constitution by their recent predecessors. Rather than 
systematically appraising the evolution of any particular right or 
rights, however, Savage proceeds obliquely. Having covered the 
Supreme Court scene for the Los Angeles Times, he builds the book 
mainly around nomination battles, both the administration fights over 
who will be nominated and the Senate fights over whether to confirm, 
together with background about Justices appointed earlier and occa-
sional discussion of cases. 
The book is weakest in its efforts at legal analysis. My favorite is 
the contrast Savage draws between Justices Scalia and O'Connor: "He 
sought decisions that were intellectually consistent; she tried to be 
* Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. - Ed. 
1. Comments of Herman Schwartz. 
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fair" (p. 204). The phrase suits Savage's apparent purpose of depicting 
Scalia as a heartless slicer of metaphysical abstractions, but the price 
paid - in injury to minimum rationality - is high. Can Savage really 
think that "fairness" and "consistency" naturally conflict?2 Isn't 
treating like cases alike a criterion of fairness? 
Generally, Savage's viewpoint is that of the tendentious editorial-
ist. Deriding Robert Bork's view that the First Amendment protects 
only political speech, he declares flatly that it would allow the White 
House "simply [to] order a ban on the publication of scientific papers 
that dispute the Administration's view" on global warming or the rela-
tion between electromagnetic fields and cancer (p. 144). The reach of 
Bork's theory is obviously a fair question, but if any Borkian phrase 
resolves these hypotheticals, Savage does not reveal it. 3 
Savage's whole theme, indeed, rests on a highly elastic treatment of 
the English language. "Under the edicts of the Rehnquist Court, the 
Bill of Rights is shrinking in significance" (p. 454). (Why "edicts"? 
The term is not traditional for judicial decisions, and I do not believe 
Savage uses it, or any similar term evoking a despot's arbitrary ukase, 
for any ruling of the Court that reflects Justice Brennan's jurispru-
dence.) One would expect this to be followed by examples of rights 
terminated or shrunk. Instead, we find cursory references to five cases 
in which an individual lost a claim against the government, without 
the slightest effort to suggest that these losses defeated rights estab-
lished in either the language of the Constitution or prior cases. One 
case, Harmelin v. Michigan, 4 modestly supports Savage's thesis, as 
Justices Scalia and Rehnquist explicitly favored abandonment of pro-
portionality analysis as a component of review under the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause;5 but the swing opinion by Justice Ken-
nedy can fairly be characterized as sorting out a mixed bag of prior 
decisions before coming down on the side of the less interventionist 
reading. 
The other four cases seem completely unhelpful to Savage's theory 
of shrinking rights. Before Cruzan, 6 there was no constitutionally pro-
tected "right to die."7 The Court's refusal to intervene on behalf of 
2. See Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 581, 586-90 (1990) (attacking Emerson's dictum that "A foolish consistency is the 
hobgoblin of little minds."). 
3. I put aside the question of how the White House would acquire power to ban any speech 
without congressional authorization. 
4. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991). 
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
6. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). 
7. In fact, the Court assumed the existence of a constitutionally protected right to refuse 
lifesaving hydration and nutrition. 110 S. Ct. at 2852. The Court then concluded that any such 
right was not violated by Missouri's requiring "clear and convincing" proof of the comatose 
patient's preference as a predicate to the withdrawal of life support. 110 S. Ct. at 2853. 
In a serious analysis of individual rights, how would one classify Cruzan? One might see it as 
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Nancy Cruzan could therefore not have shrunk such a right. Before 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 8 there was no right not to be subject to the death 
penalty solely because of evidence that there was discrimination in ap-
plying the death penalty to one's race, evidence in no way linked to the 
particular defendant's sentence. Nor was there, pre-Rust, 9 an estab-
lished right entitling one who takes government funds for a project to 
use those funds to finance speech conflicting with the purposes of the 
project defined by the funding agency. And even the dissent in United 
States v. Stanley 10 did not claim that American servicemen had previ-
ously enjoyed a right to recover damages against officials who deliber-
ately deprived them of constitutional rights; rather, it argued only that 
certain prior cases, not involving the military, called for a narrow 
reading of a decision allowing the military a broad immunity to consti-
tutional damage claims. 
Savage's language makes sense only if one assumes that courts 
must continuously expand individual rights at the expense of laws 
made by a politically responsible authority, removing ever more issues 
from effective political discourse. By this standard, justices who fail to 
propel the expansion forward are hopeless right-shrinkers. 
The strength of Turning Right lies in its occasional vignettes of the 
lives of the Justices. Indeed, the book's great claim to "balance" lies in 
its depiction of Justice Rehnquist. Off duty, it appears, he is by no 
means an ogre. We learn that he passed up one of Reagan's State of 
the Union addresses because it conflicted with his evening art class at 
the Arlington County adult education center (p. 16). He even engi-
neered a practical joke on Chief Justice Burger, arranging for a street 
photographer - with a life-size photo of Burger and a sign reading 
"Have your picture taken with the chief justice. $1" - to appear at 
the Court entrance as Burger's car swept in one morning (p. 16). A 
man who does that can't be all bad. 
Unfortunately, the personal vignettes do not, as ideal journalism 
might, supply insight into the effect of personality on the Court's 
evolution. Savage might have spotted the features of the Reagan and 
Bush appointees that prefigured their actual role in the new Court. 
How is it that these Justices preserved Roe, 11 introduced a "coercion" 
test for Establishment Clause cases12 that may end up restricting state 
use of religious ceremonial functions more than Lemon, 13 and ex-
upholding Missouri's decision to afford patients a right not to have their lives lightly terminated. 
Aren't we really addressing conflicts among individual rights? 
8. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
9. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). 
10. 483 U.S. 669, 686 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). 
11. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803 (1992) (plu-
rality opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). 
12. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). 
13. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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tended (yes, Virginia, extended) the existing rights against the discrim-
inatory use of peremptory challenges?14 
Far from identifying these developments in individual rights, Sav-
age just endorses the received wisdom. In an unusual glimpse into the 
Chief Justice's mind, he tells us that, when Rehnquist posed with Jus-
tice Kennedy on the steps of the Court immediately after swearing 
him in, "he had good reason to smile broadly, for Rehnquist knew that 
he was standing next to his fifth vote'.' (p. 182) (emphasis added). Ap-
parently he knew a lot that wasn't so, as Kennedy has given critical 
support to the interventionist side on all the above issues. Might not a 
practitioner of personal journalistic analysis have spotted the intellec-
tual or personal attributes that spelled a different story? One cannot 
ask for clairvoyance, of course, but if journalism is to add, surely it 
should venture beyond the collection of charming anecdotes into some 
sort of informed study of character and intellect. Yet one searches 
Turning Right in vain for even a premonition of the new appointees' 
failure to follow the script. 
II 
In Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States 
Supreme Court, H.W. Perry takes a totally different approach. He ex-
udes the curiosity of an anthropologist as he explores the rituals and 
beliefs of the judicial tribe, especially its most illustrious subset, the 
Justices of the Supreme Court. The area he has chosen yields quite 
naturally to anthropological inquiry. Because grants and denials of 
certiorari are not accompanied by justification (though occasionally 
dissenters from a denial will justify their views), standard legal analy-
sis is inapplicable. And, because denials so completely overwhelm 
grants, the quantitative methods evidently preferred by the political 
scientists who have previously tackled the cert process have produced 
a modest, even misleading, supply of findings (p. 119). For example, 
although political scientists of the 1950s and early 1960s recognized 
that intercircuit conflict was a factor in granting cert, 15 later studies 
appeared to undermine its significance (pp. 116-18), which was not 
restored among political scientists until publication of an article by 
Sidney Ulmer in 1984.16 All the article's quantitative methods accom-
14. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992) (restricting racially discrimina-
tory use of peremptory challenges by criminal defendant); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 
111 S. Ct. 2077, 2080 (1991) (same holding as to civil litigant). 
15. See Joseph Tanenhaus et al., The Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory, in 
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 111, 113-16, 123-24 (Glendon Schubert ed., 1963). 
16. S. Sidney Ulmer, The Supreme Court's Certiorari Decisions: Conflict as a Predictive Vari-
able, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 901 (1984); see also pp. 119, 251-52 (indicating role of Ulmer 
article). Ironically, the article that vindicated the role of intercircuit conflict starts with a denun-
ciation of "traditional legal methods" for their small data bases and "literary approaches." 
Ulmer, supra, at 901. 
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plished, however, was to remove a cloud created by those very meth-
ods, which had concealed what lawyers would have supposed obvious. 
Perry, instead, has relied mainly on interviews - with five Jus-
tices, sixty-four clerks, four Solicitors General and four high-level law-
yers in that office, a "knowledgeable" Court employee, and seven 
judges of the D.C. Circuit {p. 9). In something of a teaser, Perry 
writes that one of the most remarkable things learned from this last 
group of interviewees was "how little most of them know about the 
actual cert. process" {p. 286), but he does not reveal the gaps or errors 
in their information. 
Perry's interviews yield intriguing nuggets. Central to the cert 
process is a "discuss list" - drawn up by the Chief Justice but to 
which any Justice may add cases at will {p. 43). Listing a case assures 
an actual vote on it, but rarely any real discussion {pp. 43-49, 161). 
Death penalty cases automatically make the discuss list {pp. 92-96); 
just like a lower court contemplating a request for preliminary injunc-
tive relief, the Court sees the extremity of the consequences as affect-
ing its analysis, though in these cases only in the limited sense of 
requiring the Justices to invest more time on the substantive issues. 
Perry offers his readers a variety of insights into preferences and 
patterns in the certiorari process. At least for a time, four Justices 
were ready in principle to reexamine obscenity law; but, because they 
lacked a fifth to come out their way, they held off from granting cert, 
not wishing to elicit a decision that set their position back even fur-
ther. This produced what Perry calls a "Rule of Five" {p. 98), which 
in practice required five votes for a grant of cert on that issue. An-
other special rule has developed in practice - the Rule of Six, an 
agreed minimum for granting cert and summarily reversing the judg-
ment below {pp. 99-101). In one of his relatively rare ventures into 
quantitative methods, Perry finds that the Solicitor General has a suc-
cess for securing cert ranging from about 75% to about 90% {pp. 128-
29). One finding will be welcome news to circuit judges whose deci-
sions have drawn cert: several Justices told Perry that the chances for 
cert are better if a well-respected judge wrote the decision below, as it 
will start the Court off from a more informed point and reduce the risk 
of unpleasant surprises {p. 125). 
If political scientists may benefit from Perry's openness to non-
quantitative methods, lawyers may profit from his freedom from legal 
presuppositions. He reports that horse trading on cert petitions is 
anathema to the Justices {pp. 165-66) and then goes on to examine 
whether this norm makes sense. If Justices properly pass over cases 
they think wrongly decided because they see the Court's primary func-
tion as to unify or clarify the law - as Justices often assured him -
why should they not agree to hear cases that seem unimportant in 
order to win the chance to correct some pervasive error or eliminate a 
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muddle? Perry thinks this would be quite all right, but he acknowl-
edges that even on his premises Justices might fear a "slippery slope" 
once horse trading became accepted. He adds, rhetorically, "But 
surely if anyone can deal with slippery slopes, it is justices of the U.S. 
Supreme Court" (p. 166). Some, less confident than Perry of the 
Court's maneuvering on slippery slopes, may feel happier thinking 
that here the Court has wisely resisted temptation. 
Perry also questions the underpinnings of the reasons he received 
for the very limited character of discussion among the Justices on 
grants of certiorari. They cite time pressure, but that explanation begs 
the question of why they allocate their time as they do. While there 
appears to be some sense that face-to-face persuasion is uncollegial, he 
wonders why (pp. 161-62). Senators, he points out, do it all the time, 
while Senate lobbyists do not; does it make sense that in this respect 
Justices should act more like lobbyists than senators? 
Perry's report on the Justices' thinking reveals one striking gap. 
Although he devotes several pages to the issue of intercircuit conflict 
(pp. 246-52), I can find no mention of variations as to the impact of 
protracted disagreement among the circuits. One Justice is quoted as 
saying that it is intolerable to have one law in the Eighth Circuit and 
another in the Second (p. 247). Doesn't it somewhat depend on the 
nature of the law? Suppose two circuits split on a reading of Sentenc-
ing Guidelines,17 so that a particular type of defendant will be sen-
tenced somewhat more leniently in one region than in another. To the 
extent that this confuses criminals in their planning, need we worry? 
Apart from such planning, the split does not seem of great moment -
except as a clue that one of the courts may have egregiously erred, as 
where on the same facts defendants get five years in one circuit and 
twenty in another. 18 But egregious error has its own weight in the cert 
process, quite independent of another court's getting it right. For an 
interstate firm trying to adjust its business to federal law, and being 
driven to follow one circuit's more restrictive interpretation, however, 
the split nearly nullifies the other circuit's ruling and largely stifles any 
"percolation" of the issue (but not completely, for one-circuit firms 
can continue to press competing views). One hopes that the Court 
takes such variations into account, despite Perry's omission. 
At the end, Perry seeks to infer a "decision model" that he charac-
terizes as "a modified lexicographic decision process, that is, a hierar-
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1988) (authorizing promulgation of Sentencing Guidelines). 
18. Compare, e.g., United States v. Deal, 954 F.2d 262 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 
3256 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1992) (No. 91-8199) (holding that a defendant convicted of multiple crimes of 
violence on a single multicount indictment is subject to statutory 20-year sentence enhancements 
for "second or subsequent" convictions on all but the first count of the indictment) with United 
States v. Abreu, 962 F.2d 1447 (10th Cir.),petitionforcert.filed, (U.S. July 9, 1992) (No. 92-67) 
(holding that the sentence enhancement only applies to convictions for offenses committed after a 
judgment of conviction has been entered for a previous crime of violence). 
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chical process of decisional steps or gates through which a case must 
successfully pass before it will be accepted" (pp. 272-73). As the ac-
companying chart indicates, Perry hypothesizes a division of each Jus-
tice's thinking into an "outcome mode" and a ·~urisprudential 
mode."19 
OUTCOME 
MODE 
Yes 
Will I win on the merits? 
Yes 
No 
Institutionally 
irresponsible 
not to take 
the case? 
No JURISPRUDENTIAL 
MODE 
Care Strongly 
about outcome? No 
Conflict in circuits? 
Yes 
Yes 
Need/desire 
more percolation? 
Yes No 
Strong reason 
to resolve 
case or issue 
now? 
No 
Strong reason 
to resolve 
Is a better case likely? Yes No 
I find both features - lexicographic and two-mode thinking -
fairly implausible, although perhaps with enough stress on the adjec-
tive "modified," the lexicographic characteristic may be acceptable. 
The two-mode notion seems to suggest that within each Justice lurk 
19. Pp. 274-82. In Perry's "outcome" mode the Justice views a cert issue largely in strategic 
terms, aiming to bring about a substantive result, while in the "jurisprudential" mode the Justice 
addresses such "legalistic" issues as the problem of circuit splits. P. 274. 
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two judicial personae, either of which may take over disposition of the 
certiorari issue. The first of the lexicographic steps allocates the case 
to one of these two; thereafter, that persona controls, and the loser is 
out of the loop. 
Even Perry's own conception suggests that this is far too stratified 
an image. In the "outcome" mode, the Justice comes to the question, 
"[Is it] institutionally irresponsible not to take the case?", a question 
that surely must call on the talents of the jurisprude. Similarly, the 
"outcome" Justice asks such questions as "Good vehicle?" and "Is a 
better case likely?", both of which also appear in the ''jurisprudential" 
column. Thus, even if a Justice follows the intellectual course Perry 
outlines, the persona that won the case at the first decision point ends 
up addressing many of the same variables that his ousted counterpart 
would have considered. Thus, the process engages a genuinely single 
mind, in which various concerns compete for attention and weight un-
til the Justice decides his or her vote. 
Of course, there may be cases where one factor dominates. For 
example, the importance of an issue may be overwhelming, and the 
inferiority of all imaginable alternative vehicles may be self-evident 
(for example, later cases may be hopelessly ill suited because delay will 
generate intolerable confusion). Some cases are easy, in other words, 
because a strong factor pulls in one direction and no strong factor or 
combination pulls in the other. But these cases are completely consis-
tent with the model of a single mind trying to maximize some general, 
all-embracing goal, continuously trading off competing values. They 
are quite inconsistent with any lexicographic mode of thought, which 
assigns factors ranks that never involve tradeoffs. Thus, a consumer 
who engaged in lexicographic ranking of goods and put food first 
would buy food with all of his income up to some ceiling, and devote 
all income beyond that sum to other goods. If his income fell below 
the food ceiling, he would cut out all other items, spending not a 
penny on shelter. 20 He never trades off values at the margin. Perry 
has not established that the Justices' thinking falls into such a strange 
mode. 
Nonetheless, Perry's book is a valuable contribution. He gives a 
solid account of the cert process that will be useful both for speculative 
Court watchers and for lawyers trying to assess and maximize the 
chances of having their cases heard. More importantly, as a political 
scientist making systematic use of interviews - a technique that his 
colleagues have evidently neglected - he has bridged a gap between 
them and lawyers and opened the way for similarly integrated inquiry 
in the future. 
20. See DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, THE APPLIED THEORY OF PRICE 77-78 (1982). 
